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lution of communication. After all, a full account of the evolution of
language should include not just establishing signaling systems but also
the origin (or invention) of the signals. This requires modifying the original
game so that the players must first invent signals and then learn how to
use them. To address this, Skyrms proposes a model that is able to rep-
resent an evolving signaling game as the agents (represented as a variation
of simple reinforcement learners) invent new signals during the course of
interaction. Introducing this possibility of invention allows the agents to
avoid the evolutionary traps of suboptimal signaling. More impressively,
Skyrms finds that individuals in this model can begin with no signals and
invent a signaling system from scratch that almost always enables near
perfect communication.
The book ends with a set of chapters exploring the connections between
signaling and networks of individuals. There are a number of interesting
models examined including signal-mediated teamwork, dialogue, and dy-
namic networks of signaling. The results here are primarily exploratory
but are very intriguing.
In summary, Skyrms succeeds in showing that effective signaling sys-
tems can arise from very simple processes such as basic reinforcement
learning or natural selection. But in doing so, he opens new avenues for
research and raises many interesting questions. I think one of the most
important contributions of Signals is in demonstrating the capabilities of
a new research program. Overall, Skyrms’s Signals is a thought-provoking
introduction to an area of research that is rapidly developing and promises
to reshape the way we think about a number of issues in philosophy of
language and epistemology.
RORY SMEAD, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Elliott Sober, Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? Philosophical Essays
on Darwin’s Theory. Amherst, NY: Prometheus (2011), 230 pp., $21.00.
Elliott Sober’s latest book, Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?
Philosophical Essays on Darwin’s Theory, arrives as a result of Sober’s
winning the Prometheus Prize, awarded by the American Philosophical
Association and Prometheus Press. The award is intended “to honor a
distinguished philosopher in recognition of his or her lifetime contribution
to expanding the frontiers of research in philosophy and science,” and we
certainly agree that the selection of Sober for this prize fulfills this charge.
The book comes in five chapters. The first is the title chapter for the
book, which considers whether Darwin’s argument in the Origin is, in
fact, presented backward. The second chapter is an extended treatment
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of the history of the problem of group selection, focusing significantly on
Darwin’s thoughts on the subject. The third chapter is an exploration of
the development of sex ratio theory, beginning with Arbuthnot and Ber-
noulli’s work in demographics and proceeding through Darwin to Ham-
ilton. The fourth chapter is an extended treatment of methodological
naturalism. The fifth chapter, the postscript, contains three separate short
essays: a further discussion of the “cladistic parsimony” arguments raised
in the first chapter, some work on the units of selection problem, and a
discussion of the interpretation of probability in evolutionary theory.
Before continuing, it is important to note the relationship between these
book chapters and much of Sober’s other work. Since it is a response to
the commission of the prize essay, this book reads much like Sober’s
“greatest hits.” The first chapter is a revised and extended version of
Sober’s (2009a) article from the Darwin Year issue of the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences. A provocative piece when published,
this article was followed by an extensive scholarly discussion at the Na-
tional Humanities Center’s “On the Human” forum (Sober 2010a). The
second chapter, on the development of group selection, is new material,
but it is familiar ground for Sober, perhaps most of all from his work
with D. S. Wilson (Sober and Wilson 1998). The third chapter, on sex
ratio theory, is an expanded version of another article on similar themes
(Sober 2007). The new material in chapter 4, on methodological natu-
ralism, constitutes a return for Sober to another familiar topic (see, e.g.,
Sober 2008b, 2009b, 2011a). The postscript combines Sober’s work on
evolutionary probabilities (2010b), parsimony arguments (2008a, 2008b),
and levels of selection (2011b).
The title of the book would lead one to think that, in its eponymous
first chapter, Sober will provide us with insight into the development of
the structure of the Origin—showing, perhaps via historical analysis, why
it moves from artificial selection to natural section to arguments for evo-
lution and common descent. Such a story would be rich in the details of
Darwin’s correspondence, of his perception of the Origin’s intended au-
dience, and so on. But this is not the story that Sober gives us. Instead,
Sober is concerned with evidence: What is the evidential basis grounding
natural selection and common descent? Sober’s conclusion is that the
Origin is evidentially inverted. That is, the evidence for evolution comes
after the mechanism proposed to account for this evidence. From this
perspective, Sober concludes that Darwin ought to have presented all of
the available evidence for evolution and only then presented his mecha-
nism explaining it. It is this logical sense in which Sober argues that the
Origin was written backward.
Notably, this is consistent with the claim that, rhetorically, the Origin
was in fact structured optimally rather than backward. Sober does note
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the connection between Darwin’s argument and Herschel’s work on verae
causae (32–33), drawing on the extensive work of Hodge (1977, 1983,
1992). It is, however, difficult to escape the feeling that the issue of “right
order” is, at its base, a historical question—and a question that the Darwin
studies community has done an adept job of answering over the last 40
years.
Chapter 2, which discusses Darwin and group selection, exhibits a dis-
connect between the logical arguments surrounding this biological prob-
lem and contemporary biological evidence. Sober relies on hypothetical
examples to demonstrate that group selection is theoretically possible.
However, in the absence of more recent experimental evidence, to tie
Darwin’s views on group selection to a critique of philosophical ideas
prevalent in the 1960s is an odd temporal juxtaposition and leaves us to
question the value of interpreting his works within this particular context.
It appears that this essay is historical in nature, but, by leaving out helpful
historical details in favor of thought experiments, we are left wondering
why this particular period of time (and not the present) serves as the
appropriate backdrop for Darwin’s ideas.
A different issue regarding history arises in the discussion of sex ratio
in chapter 3. Sober nicely tracks the sex ratio literature available up to
the time of Darwin and shows how sex ratio data were used to justify
the existence of intelligent design. His explanation of the logic and hy-
pothesis testing required to offer support for intelligently designed sex
ratios provides historical insight into why Darwin attempted to address
sex ratios but then backed off in his later writing. Sober then follows
some of the progression of the post-Darwin literature, but, similar to
chapter 2, the lack of recent citations leaves the reader with the impression
that sex ratios have been empirically underexplored. For example, Ham-
iltonian sex ratios have been supported by experiments even in single-
celled malaria parasites (Reece, Drew, and Gardner 2008), highlighting
the strength of Hamilton’s theory. Reference to this broad area of recent
biological work would have helped cement Sober’s argument that sex
ratios can serve as a “test case” for the proof of evolution contra crea-
tionism (115–19).
In chapter 4, Sober’s formulation of methodological naturalism (MN)
is unorthodox, phrased as a moral imperative regarding what science
should not do, namely, “make claims about the existence and properties
of a supernatural deity” (121). Sober then concludes that evolutionary
theory does not rule out the intervention of God in nature because there
remains room in the theory for “hidden variables” underlying evolution-
ary probabilities—be they of the supernatural or the naturalistic variety
(134). The relevance of this conclusion about hidden variables to MN is
not obvious: as he has formulated that thesis, it is not a claim about what
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the data do or do not rule out but rather a normative constraint on the
practice of science. It should not surprise us that he concludes with a
“modest” (149) defense of MN. But this defense seems both pragmatic
and glib: “The modest defense I would offer of methodological naturalism
is simply this: If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it” (148).
Chapter 5 offers three quite nice shorter pieces drawn from Sober’s
current work. The section on probabilities, in particular, is a welcome
contribution to the literature and is perhaps Sober’s most forceful case
yet offered for his interpretation of the probabilities at work in evolu-
tionary theory.
Given the broad scope of the book, Sober’s challenge was to knit these
disparate topics into a coherent narrative. True to the book’s title, he
intended a focus on Darwin to serve as this common thread—and the
book certainly succeeds in offering us a deeper appreciation of Darwin
and his work. It is at this point, however, that we believe Sober’s greatest
fault lies. His attempt at unifying this material makes acute the problem
of the work’s audience. The book reaches a level of sophistication beyond
most undergraduates—few of whom will have the patience for the math-
ematics of group selection or sex ratios—and yet its discussion is too
disjointed to serve as research material for interested graduate students
and professionals, especially since, as we have noted, Sober has tackled
these issues elsewhere.
For the generalist philosopher or those unfamiliar with philosophy of
biology in general, this volume can provide a worthy introduction to
Sober’s work. We also see an avenue for the book outside the academic
philosophy of biology, in education or the public sphere surrounding
debates over evolution. This book, for these audiences, would provide an
example of subtle yet principled thought on several topics in evolutionary
biology—many of them linked, unfortunately, in being perceived by in-
telligent design advocates as points of weakness in evolutionary theory.
In this context, Sober handily shows that these perceptions of weakness
are unjustified.
All in all, Sober’s book is both a welcome contribution and a well-
written overview of his wealth of philosophical work. Our concerns with
packaging and audience are, to some degree, par for the course when
writing a collection of this sort, and we have no doubt that this book
exemplifies precisely the quality of both philosophical and scientific schol-
arship for which Sober has justly been honored.
CHARLES H. PENCE, HOPE HOLLOCHER, RYAN NICHOLS,
GRANT RAMSEY, EDWIN SIU DANIEL, AND JOHN SPORTIELLO
University of Notre Dame




Hodge, M. J. S. 1977. “The Structure and Strategy of Darwin’s ‘Long Argument.’” British
Journal for the History of Science 10 (3): 237–46.
———. 1983. “The Development of Darwin’s General Biological Theorizing.” In Evolution
from Molecules to Men, ed. D. S. Bendall, 43–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
———. 1992. “Darwin’s Argument in the Origin.” Philosophy of Science 59 (3): 461–64.
Reece, Sarah E., Damien R. Drew, and Andy Gardner. 2008. “Sex Ratio Adjustment and
Kin Discrimination in Malaria Parasites.” Nature 453:609–14.
Sober, Elliott. 2007. “Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern: An Eighteenth-Century De-
bate about Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology.”
In Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, ed. Jessica
Riskin, 131–62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2008a. Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2008b. “Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy—a Test Case for
NaturalismP.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83
(2): 117–55.
———. 2009a. “Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 106:10048–55.
———. 2009b. “Why Methodological Naturalism?” Unpublished manuscript, Philosophy
Department, University of Wisconsin–Madison, http://philosophy.wisc.edu/sober/why
%20methodological%20naturalism%20rome%20format%20june%202009.pdf.
———. 2010a. “Common Ancestry and Natural Selection in Darwin’s Origin.” On the
Human, National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, NC, http://onthehuman
.org/2010/06/common-ancestry-and-natural-selection-in-darwin%E2%80%99s-origin/.
———. 2010b. “Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro-Probabilities.” In The Place
of Probability in Science, ed. Ellery Eells and J. H. Fetzer, 133–61. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2011a. “Evolution without Naturalism.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion,
vol. 3, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, 187–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011b. “Realism, Conventionalism, and Causal Decomposition in Units of Selection:
Reflections on Samir Okasha’s Evolution and the Levels of Selection.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 221–31.
Sober, Elliott, and D. S. Wilson. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
